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I. Introduction 
This paper aims to investigate to what extent arbitral tribunals 
in investment disputes consider state ownership of business entities 
as a factor when deciding whether the actions of the state-owned 
business entity (“SOE”) in question are attributable to the State.  
This paper will address this, in the following order: It (i) gives a 
background on the concept of SOE’s, the notion of attribution, and 
explains how tribunals consider attribution in investment treaty 
arbitration cases; (ii) with the aid of  investment arbitration case 
law, presents tests that are commonly used by arbitrators when 
conducting their attribution analysis, with a focus on how state 
ownership of the entity in question is analyzed under each test; (iii) 
notes important limitations; and (iv) demonstrates how state 
ownership, although not a decisive factor, remains significantly 
relevant to establish attribution in the context of bilateral 
investment treaty (“BIT”) arbitration. 
   This paper aims to provide the reader with a general 
understanding of the doctrinal basis of attribution in the investment 
arbitration arena and showcase how tribunals may weigh over the 
state ownership of the business entities under scrutiny when 
undergoing their attribution analysis. 
II. Background  
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In many countries, business entities, instead of the central 
government, manage domestic industries deemed important for 
that particular country.  In some cases, these individual entities are 
owned either wholly or partially by the state, referred to as state-
owned entities (“SOE”), and deal with foreign investors.2  They are 
separate legal entities with the dual purpose of (i) specializing in 
the management of these important domestic industries, and (ii) 
dealing with foreign investors who are interested in investing 
domestically.3 
When actions of an SOE allegedly harm the rights of a foreign 
investor under an applicable international treaty, the foreign 
investor may try to resolve the dispute through investment 
arbitration.  In this scenario, attribution becomes an incredibly 
important issue because it establishes a nexus between the actions 
of a private entity and the host state. Here, if the state violates its 
international obligations through the actions or inactions of the 
SOE in question, it can be held liable for the resulting grievances 
suffered by the foreign investor. 
In the attribution analysis, tribunals generally consider 
customary international law on state responsibility, specifically 
Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts by the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”).4  Prior to analyzing attribution, a general 
understanding of these provisions as a whole is paramount, as they 
embody the doctrinal essence with which arbitral tribunals 
predominantly conduct the attribution analysis. 
In general terms, these provisions enumerate obligations 
that a state has towards individuals and legal entities.  While the 
ILC articles are not binding, they are internationally recognized as 
a codification of principles of customary international law on state 
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attribution.5  Moreover, tribunals commonly allude to ILC Articles 
4, 5, and 8 in their attribution analysis one way or another, and for 
uniformity purposes are herein referenced to as the ‘Structure 
Test,’ ‘Function Test,’ and ‘Control Test,’ respectively. Much like 
in CMS v. Argentina6 and SGS v. Philippines7, arbitral tribunals 
may analyze these tests separately, and in the end, attribution can 
be established with a favorable finding on any of these articles.8  
On rare occasions, tribunals also consider the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil to establish attribution.  These four 
considerations and their limitations will be further explained in the 
remainder of this paper.  
In investment treaty disputes, tribunals tend to commence 
their attribution analysis by verifying whether the state owns the 
private entity in question.  The logical reason for this is explored in 
Maffezini v. Spain, where the tribunal stated that attribution is more 
easily established when state ownership is present.9  It is important 
to note that when SOEs are involved, attribution claims will be 
argued in both the jurisdictional and merits stages of the case.  At 
the jurisdictional stage, the investor only needs to establish a prima 
facie case that the acts of the SOE are attributable to the state.10  
This prima facie test is widely used by tribunals in ICSID cases 
like CMS v. Argentina, SGS v. Philippines, and Salini v. Jordan, 
and non-ICSID cases like United Parcel Service v. Canada.11  
Later on in the proceeding, state ownership is considered on the 
merits when the tribunal decides whether the acts or omissions of 
the SOE are effectively attributable to the state.  This paper will 
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now analyze the different ‘tests’ arbitrators consider when 
conducting their attribution analysis, more specifically how each of 
these apply to SOE scenarios. 
III. Structural Analysis 
Tribunals may evaluate the Structure Test first, as was the 
case in Maffezini. This test seeks to find whether a state can be 
found liable through its organs.12  Pursuant to principles set forth in 
Article 4 of the ILC, here tribunals evaluate whether the structure 
of the entity in question falls under the umbrella of a state, as a 
state organ.13  On this point, I found secondary materials differ on 
whether domestic law of the country in question is applicable to 
find the entity as a state organ.14  The bottom line is that if an 
entity is considered a state organ, the actions of the SOE may be 
attributable to the state.15  As a side note, the reach of this analysis 
also extends to acts of entities relating to, or owned by, provincial 
and local levels of government.16  
The circumstances in Maffezini provide a good example of 
Structural Test analysis.  The case involved a dispute between an 
Argentinian foreign investor, Maffezini, and a public Spanish 
entity, SODIGA, over the failure of a joint venture called 
EAMSA.17  The tribunal classified SODIGA as a state organ, 
deemed that its actions fell inside the scheme of public 
administration, hence found the state liable for SODIGA’s errors.18  
In the jurisdictional decision, the tribunal importantly added that 
whenever a state directly or indirectly owns a private entity, there 
is a rebuttable presumption that the entity is a state organ.19  As a 
result, state ownership of the business entity in question will likely 
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suffice for the arbitral tribunal to find for attribution under the 
Structure Test. 
The holding in Maffezini was corroborated in August 2016 
in the non-ICSID case Flemingo DutyFree Shop v. Poland.20  The 
case involved a dispute over the rescission of a lease by Chopin 
airport in Poland, which was fully owned by the Polish 
government.  The tribunal found that the airport’s action was 
attributable to the state.21  It reasoned that the state, through its full 
ownership, interacted with the airport in a way that invariably 
made it a de facto state organ.22  The tribunal cited interactions 
such as the government's modernization of the airport, and the 
Secretary of State's public statements on behalf of the airport to the 
Ministry of Transport.23 
IV. Control Analysis 
Tribunals also consider the Control Test to enrich their 
attribution analysis.  Under ILC Article 8, the tribunal evaluates 
whether the entity in question acted pursuant to the instructions of, 
or under the directions of, the host state.24  Here, when presented 
with an attribution claim involving an SOE, an arbitral tribunal 
effectively considers whether, directly or indirectly, state 
ownership enabled the state to exert control over the actions or 
omissions of the SOE that brought about the claim.  If such control 
is present, the arbitral tribunal may find for attribution under the 
Control Test. 
The occurrences in EDF v. Romania provide a good example 
of how state ownership may be relevant under the Control Test 
analysis.  In this case, the claimant argued that the termination of 
its agreement with AIBO (an SOE), TAROM and AIBO’s 
organization, regarding a lease for a commercial space at the 
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Otopeni airport in Romania, was attributable to the state.  This 
finding was a result of, inter alia, the Control Test embodied in 
ILC Article 8.25  Although the state submitted that it did not 
exercise control over AIBO beyond its role as a shareholder,26 the 
tribunal found that the Ministry of Transportation had acted within 
the meaning of ILC Article 8.  It reasoned that the state had issued 
instructions to AIBO and TAROM, involving the conduct with 
which they should exercise their shareholder rights “in order to 
achieve a particular result,” which was to “bring[] to an end, or not 
extend[], the contractual arrangements with [EDF].” 27  This was 
the action that constituted the BIT violation.  In the end, the 
tribunal concluded that the aforementioned conduct, which was 
conducted through state ownership of AIBO, fell within the 
meaning of ILC Article 8, hence attributable to Romania.28  
Arbitral tribunals have used variations of the Control Test, 
where state ownership of the entity in question remains an 
important factor in establishing attribution.  In Jan de Nul NV v. 
Egypt, the investor alleged that the SOE misrepresented terms 
involving the scope and nature of an agreement concerning the 
expansion of the Suez Canal. 29  In its claim, the investor sought to 
establish that the SOE’s actions were attributable to the state.30  
The tribunal used the two-fold “Effective Control” test,31 which in 
order to be met (i) the state must have a general control over the 
entity, and (ii) the state must specifically have control over the act 
in question. In this case, although the facts did not lead to a finding 
of attribution,32 the analysis the tribunal discussed remains 
important for our purposes.  Considering this framework, state 
ownership could be a relevant factor under the effective control 
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analysis, whereby states, through their ownership interest in the 
SOE, exert general control (first part of analysis) and specific 
control (second part of analysis) over the SOE’s actions, enabling 
tribunals to establish attribution. 
V. Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Piercing the corporate veil is a special form of attribution, 
where the liability resulting from the breach of a contractual 
obligation, instead of the act that constitutes the breach of 
international law, is attributed to the state.  Piercing the corporate 
veil is the mechanism through which tribunals remedy 
circumstances recognized, for example, on ILC Article 8’s 
commentary: “[W]here the ‘corporate veil’ is a mere device or a 
vehicle for fraud or evasion.”33  Hence, if state ownership over an 
SOE is used as a vehicle to commit fraud or evasion by the state, 
an arbitral tribunal could justifiably pierce the veil and make the 
SOE’s actions in question attributable to the state. 
In this vein, a case that acknowledged the applicability of 
veil piercing in the investment arbitration arena was Deutsche 
Bank AG v. Sri Lanka.  That case involved a dispute against CPC, 
a SOE fully owned by Sri Lanka, for defaulting in payments due 
under a hedging agreement.34  Therein, Deutsche Bank 
successfully argued that Sri Lanka used its ownership in the 
company to (i) exercise significant control over negotiations; (ii) 
execute the hedging agreement; and (iii) steer CPC’s refusal to pay 
the amounts due to claimant.35  There, although the arbitral tribunal 
did not pierce the corporate veil, it recognized attribution could 
happen if “the [SOE] has no effective independent existence or 
where the conduct of the State justifies lifting the corporate veil.”36 
VI. Limitations 
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State ownership may not be dispositive in all attribution 
analyses.  The commentary on ILC Article 8 notes, “Since [SOEs], 
although owned and in that sense subject to the control of the 
[s]tate, are considered to be separate, prima facie their conduct in 
carrying out their activities is not attributable unless they are 
exercising elements of governmental authority within the meaning 
of [ILC] article 5.”37  
On this note, a clear example of applicable limitations lies 
when arbitral tribunals consider ILC Article 5, under the ‘Function 
Test.’  Instead of focusing on ownership, this test focuses on 
whether the activity that gave rise to the claim is an activity 
generally reserved to the host state.  It consists of two elements: (i) 
whether the activity by the SOE is governmental in nature; and (ii) 
whether such activity gave rise to the dispute.  If both are met, the 
test favors a finding for attribution.  It is important to note that in 
the Function Test, unlike the other two tests mentioned under the 
ILC Articles, the focus is on the nature of the action and not the 
actor.  
Another limitation worth noting concerns the Structure 
Test.  Although state ownership is important to establish attribution 
under the Structure Test, it is still possible for a state-owned entity 
to not be considered an organ of the state.  Limited Liability 
Company AMTO v. Ukraine is a good illustration of this limitation.  
In this case, the claimant, AMTO, was an investment company 
interested in entering the nuclear energy industry in Ukraine.38 
AMTO bought a considerable number of shares of EYUM-10, a 
company that had several maintenance contracts with the state-
owned Energoatom, the National Nuclear Power Generating 
Company of Ukraine.39  Upon bankruptcy, Energoatom defaulted 
in its contracts with EYUM-10.  However, due to Ukrainian 
bankruptcy law, AMTO, as partial owner of EYUM-10, was 
unable to enforce several court orders against Energoatom.40  
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Notwithstanding state ownership of Energoatom, the arbitral 
tribunal decided that under the case at hand Energoatom was not a 
state organ of Ukraine.41  Although the arbitral tribunal in AMTO 
did not go into detail as to why they did not find Energoatom to be 
a state organ of Ukraine, the case exemplifies an important 
limitation on the Structure Test.  Namely, that state ownership of a 
business entity does not guarantee that it will be deemed a state 
organ and pass the Structure Test.  
Moreover, there are times when a SOE may violate a right 
of a foreign investor without breaching international law 
protections.  As James Crawford noted in the ILC commentaries, 
holding all or a significant number of shares in a corporation does 
not amount to controlling every act of that entity to create liability 
for their every action.42  This was the case in Impregilo v. 
Pakistan, where the tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to rule 
over the breach of a municipal contract by a state-owned entity 
because the issue only concerned a breach of a municipal contract 
and not any rights enshrined in the relevant Italy-Pakistan 
investment treaty.43 
VII. Conclusions 
While acknowledging that there is no binding precedent in 
investment treaty caselaw, tribunal decisions in many investment 
arbitrations demonstrate that state ownership, although not 
decisive, can be a very significant consideration for arbitral 
tribunals to resolve the issue of attribution. 
Furthermore, although there are considerations, like the 
Function Test, where state ownership is not evaluated, it is 
important to identify that, as implied by the tribunal in Maffezini, 
each of the aforementioned tests are elements to be considered 
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separately.  Furthermore, they do not necessarily need to be 
cumulative for the tribunal to conclude one way or another on the 
issue of attribution.44  
Lastly, as the wide range of investment treaty cases in this 
paper show, whenever the acts of a state-owned entity are in 
question, state ownership will surely play an important role, in one 
way or another, in the tribunal’s attribution analysis.
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